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Degree of Instant Competition: 
Estimation of Market Power in India’s Instant Coffee Market 
 






The new competition policy of the Government of India seeks to promote competition to protect 
consumer  interests  and  increase market  efficiency.    In  fact,  the  degree  of price  transmission 
between farmers and final consumers also depends on the degree of competition in the processing 
sector.    Moreover, policy  of  trade  liberalization  too  is  expected  to  have  impact  on  domestic 
markets.  It becomes imperative, therefore, that one knows the degree of competition in various 
domestic industries.  Instant coffee market in India is a duopoly of Nestlé and Hindustan Lever for 
decades.  They also differentiate their products through branding.  At the same time, however, 
incumbents might have perceived potential competition from another firm, Tata Coffee.  In fact, 
instant coffee can be considered as a part of a larger beverage market with numerous competing 
products.  With trade liberalization, imports have also started trickling in.  Thus, circumstantial 
evidence regarding degree of competition or the market power in the instant coffee market is 
rather mixed one.  By econometrically estimating the perceived first-order supply relation and the 
demand function, we calculate the market power parameter.  Results indicate that the market is 
not characterized by collusive behaviour.  It is quite close to perfectly competitive behaviour 
although we cannot reject the Cournot-Nash behaviour as well.  The econometric study may be 
complemented by in-depth case study on coffee procurement, processing, and pricing by leading 
producers.  Similar estimations of market power and case studies may be undertaken for other 
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1.  The Instant Coffee Market 
Legend has it that circa 1600, Baba Budan, a pilgrim returning to India, carried several 
coffee beans from the city of Mocha in Yemen and planted them in India.  From these 
initial seeds, India’s coffee plantation industry has grown to a production level of about 
275 thousand tonnes of coffee beans.  Historically India has been exporting most of its 
coffee beans.  However, domestic consumption is on the rise.  Now, more than a fourth of 
the coffee beans are used for domestic processing and consumption.  In fact, volume of 
sales has increased by about 30 percent in the last 5 years.  Consumers in the southern 
states of India are mostly coffee (non-tea) drinkers.  While their traditional preference has 
been for filter coffee, with the invention and commercial application of freeze-drying 
technology by Nestlé, and, with changing lifestyles over the decades, instant coffee is 
gaining ground in the minds of consumers.  Similarly, in the northern states of India, 
while  proportion of tea drinkers  is larger,  those  who  drink coffee  prefer only instant 
coffee.  As a result, demand for instant coffee has a wider acceptance across the country 
(Euromonitor, 2006). 
 
In the year 2005, formal-sector retail sales of processed coffee were about 14 thousand 
tonnes valuing 4.3 billion rupees.  The size of instant coffee was about 4.4 thousand 
tonnes valuing at little more than 3 billion rupees.  Evidence from Latin America shows 
that due to high capital intensity of the instant coffee production, firm concentration is 
very high in those markets (Talbot, 1997).  India has witnessed a duopoly market for 
instant coffee.  Initially Nestlé was the only player in the domestic market.  However, in 
1969 Hindustan Lever launched its brand, Bru, and has become a major competitor of 
Nestlé since then.  Nestlé had to come out with Sunrise, its own equivalent of Bru, and 
now  these  two  rival  brands  completely  dominate  the  domestic  instant  coffee  market.  
Though  Nestlé  has  been  a  leader,  market  share  of  Bru  has  increased  over  time  and 
currently it stands at about 40 percent.  Tata Coffee too produces instant coffee, although 
at this time it caters only to export market.  A few years ago, however, it has augmented 
its plant capacity to 2500 tonnes a year, and, has introduced Tata Kaapi and Tata Café 
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As far as competition from imports is concerned, the domestic industry was protected 
through quantitative restrictions till the year 2000.  Currently, no import quota exists but a 
‘moderate’  customs  duty  of  30  percent  is  applied  on  instant  coffee  (CBEC,  2006).  
Accordingly, during the financial year 2005-06, instant coffee worth Rs. 4.1 crore was 
imported and it represented a 46 percent rise in imports over the previous year (DGFT, 
2006).  So far, no foreign direct investment has come forth from major coffee producers 
such as Maxwell House or Folgers.  Starbucks is thinking of making an entry, but it will 
be  in  food  service  industry  where  Barista  and  Café  Coffee  Day  already  have  been 
operating  their  coffee  shops.    In  this  paper,  we  study  the  market  for  instant  coffee 
(powder) sold to the final consumers.  
 
2.  Motivation 
 
The instant coffee market is an interesting case of an imperfectly competitive market.  
The market structure is a duopoly, for Nestlé and Hindustan Lever have been the only two 
firms operating in this market for decades.  Through branding, both have introduced a 
certain  degree  of  product  differentiation  and  brand  loyalty.    Therefore,  one  may 
conjecture a high degree of market power enjoyed by these firms.  Having had enough 
time  to  give  signals  to  each  other,  one  could  even  hypothesize  a  tacitly  collusive 
behaviour  between  the  two  firms.    On  the  other  hand,  however,  apart  from  the 
competition between the two, the incumbent duopolists might have perceived a potential 
competition from the prospective entrant, Tata Coffee, invoking the seminal idea of limit 
pricing (Bain, 1949).  Moreover, if the industry is envisaged in a broader context – i.e., 
beverage segment, then the existence of a number of competing products may lead one to 
conjecture a more competitive behaviour by the firms.  Therefore, if one motivates a Folk 
Theorem  argument  (Friedman,  1971),  any  outcome  -  collusive,  Cournot-Nash,  or 
competitive is possible depending upon the kind of strategic interaction the firms may 
have between them.  In a recent paper, Adams (2006) made observations on the beer 
markets in US and Germany.  He points out that production technologies and consumer 
preferences  determine  the  structure  and  the  vigour  of  competition.    While  scale 
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0.95, in the German market, preference for local beers (competing products) over national 
brands has led to a low 4-firm concentration ratio of just 0.29.   
In this context, we would like to estimate the degree of competition in the Indian instant 
coffee  market.    This  exercise  is  important  not  merely  from  academic  perspective 
mentioned  above,  but  from  the  emerging  policy  perspectives  as  well.    The  new 
Competition Act, 2002 which replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
(MRTP)  act,  emphasizes  competition  to  protect  consumer  interests  and  promote 
efficiency (ML&J, 2003).  The commission would, therefore, like to know degree of 
market power in various domestic industries.  Until 1992-93, the marketing of coffee 
beans was wholly administered by the Coffee Board – a statutory organization set up 
under the Coffee Act, 1942.  However, Coffee Board’s role in marketing the beans has 
been completely eliminated over time.  Amendments made in its role in 1996 allow the 
growers to sell their produce directly to the processing firms.  This implies that growers 
are now exposed to free-market price realization for their beans.  Although this seems 
only  fair,  evidence  suggests  that  price  transmission  between  farmers  and  consumers 
depends  on  the  degree  of  market  power  in  the  processing  sector  (e.g.  Fletcher  and 
Deodhar, 1998).  The higher the degree of market power in the processing sector, the 
lower  is  the  transmission  of  hike  (fall)  in  retail  (farm  gate)  prices  to  farmers  (final 
consumers).  Therefore, both from farmers’ and consumers’ perspective, it is important to 
know the degree of market power in the processing industry.  Moreover, Hwang and Mai 
(1988) show that impact of trade restriction (or its elimination) will depend on the initial 
values of conjectural variation in the domestic market.  If a domestic industry is collusive 
in nature, trade liberalization will have an impact by increasing competition in the market.  
However,  in  the  presence  of  quota  or  tariff-rate-quota,  domestic  firms  might  have 
behaved  in  Cournot-Nash  form,  and,  therefore,  pro-competitive  impact  of  trade 
liberalization may not be as much as it would have been if the domestic market were 
collusive.  Thus knowing the degree of market power empirically assumes importance. 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
Most industrial organization economists agree that the appropriate measure of the degree 
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of a firm/industry to raise price above marginal cost.  A unit-less measure for the market 







   
This can be measured directly if adequate data on firms’ marginal cost are available. 
Unfortunately such detailed information about marginal cost is rarely available.  Most of 
the  research  in  the  Structure-Conduct-Performance  tradition  adopted  a  proxy  for  the 
Lerner Index originally introduced by Collins and Preston (1969) which uses average 
variable cost (AVC) rather than marginal cost.  However, except for competitive firms in 
long-run equilibrium, average (variable) cost is not a good approximation to the marginal 
cost.    An  alternative  index,  Tobin’s  q,  a  firm’s  financial  market  value  divided  by 
replacement cost of its tangible assets, should on average, equal one under competitive 
conditions.  But if intangible assets (for example expense on advertising and research and 
development) are large and ignored in the valuation of the firm, then q could exceed one 
even in the absence of market power.  Measures of profits and rate of returns are not good 
substitutes either for the price-cost margin.  They use accounting as opposed economic 
definitions  of  cost,  employ  arbitrary  depreciation  rules,  and  do  not  treat  the  cost  of 
advertising  and  research  and  development  reasonably.    Fisher  and  McGowan  (1983) 
indicate  that  the  time  profile  of  the  benefits  derived  from  investments,  depreciation 
methods used and the growth rates of the firms differ among firms, hence, the comparison 
of accounting rates of return is misleading. 
 
The emergence of the new empirical industrial organization was to some extent motivated 
by the dissatisfaction over these issues.  Survey articles by Bresnahan (1989) and Perloff 
(1992) show that in the last decade, relatively complete structural econometric models 
based on formal profit-maximizing theories have been used to estimate the degree of 
market power in specific industries. This literature has grown into several directions, the 
variety reflecting the differences in the availability of the data and the institutional details 
of the industries. The approach followed in this paper is a special case of the model 
suggested by Bresnahan (1982). The aim is to estimate the parameter of market power 
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market.  Let firm 1 expect firm 2 to produce 
e
2 q  units of output.  If firm 1 produces q1 
units of output, then the total output that it expects to be sold in the market is
e
2 1 q q Q + = .  
The profit maximizing problem for firm 1 is given by: 
                     
(2)  Arg max  )] (q c [P(Q)q 1 1 1 − ,                                           
 
where P(Q) is the inverse demand function and c1(q1) is firm 1’s total cost function. The 
first-order condition for this problem is: 
 













+                                                   
 
where MC1 (.) is firm 1’s marginal cost.  If the derivatives are treated as discrete changes, 
then the change in Q can be expressed as: dQ = dq1 + 
e

















     
 
In the equilibrium, 
e
2 q  = q2, therefore, the equilibrium expression (3) can be re-written as: 
 
(5)  ( ) 1 1 1
1












+ + .   
                                                                   
The term  1 2/dq dq  in the equation (5) is the conjectural variations term.  It summarizes 
how firm 1 conjectures firm 2 will vary its output when firm 1 makes a small change in 
output.  Denote this term as V.  Assuming that the firms are symmetric, (i.e. they have 
identical costs), and, therefore, produce the same level of output, then equation (5) can be 








IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 8  W.P.  No.  2006-10-02 









+                                                                                 
 
The above equation can be rewritten as: 
 
(7)     MC Q
dQ
dP
λ P(Q) = + , where 







λ                                                                                      
                                                            
The parameter λ is the market power parameter and the left-hand-side of equation (7) is 
called the perceived marginal revenue.  From equation (7), it is obvious that if firms 
demonstrate Bertrand-Nash or competitive behaviour, value of λ will be 0 and equation 
(7) gives the usual condition of price equal to marginal cost in a perfectly competitive 
market.  If firms demonstrate perfectly collusive behaviour, then the value of λ becomes 1 
so that it mimics the profit maximizing behaviour of a monopolist.  Similarly, λ will take 
a value of 1/n if the firms behave in Cournot-Nash fashion, i.e., V = 0.  In a duopoly case, 
therefore, this value will be 0.5.  From (8) it is easily verified that collusive behaviour 
will imply V = 1, and perfectly competitive behaviour will imply V = -1/ (n -1).  In a 
duopoly case this value will be -1.  Moreover, Lerner Index as described in (1) can now 












=  ,   
 




                                                 
† Although Lerner Index (L) is easy to get from the market power parameter and price elasticity of demand, 
ideally one would like to estimate mark up of price over marginal cost, (P-MC) / MC.  This index is called 
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Given  the  above  theoretical  background,  the  following  empirical  procedure  can  be 
adopted  to  estimate  the  degree  of  market  power  in  the  Indian  instant  coffee  market. 
Suppose the demand function is specified in linear form as: 
 
(10)  t1 t 2 t 1 0 t ε Z α P α α Q + + + = .   
 
Here Qt is the quantity of instant coffee  sold, Pt is the  retail price, Zt is a vector of 
exogenous variables and εt1 is the error term.  Moreover, suppose that marginal cost takes 
the following functional form: 
 
(11)  T γ W γ γ MC 2 t 1 0 t + + = .   
 
Wt is the wholesale price of the essential input i.e. green coffee beans.  Trend changes in 
other input cost such as packaging, transport, unskilled labor etc. are captured in the trend 
variable T. Overall, marginal costs are assumed to be constant with respect to output.  
This amounts to considering decreasing average cost in a capital intensive plant and linear 
variable cost.  Equation (11) can now be substituted into profit-maximizing condition (7).  
Rearranging terms, the following linear equation is derived: 
 
(12)   t2 t 3 2 t 1 0 t ε Q γ T γ W γ γ P + + + + = , 
     
where the variables are defined as above, εt2 is the error term, and γ3 = - λ [dPt/dQt].  
From equation (10), the slope of the inverse demand function [dPt/dQt] is given by the 
term 1/α1.  Therefore, the market power parameter is nothing more than the product of two 
regression coefficients with a negative sign, i.e., λ = - α1γ3. 
 
It should be noted at this point that Bresnahan (1982) presented a generalized form of this 
approach where marginal cost is assumed variable.  If equation (11) had an additional 
term γ4Qt on the right hand side, it would mean MCt varies with respect to output.  In that 
case, the coefficient of Qt in equation would have been (γ3 + γ4).  Since marginal cost is 
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value of γ3 cannot be found, even though the estimated value of (γ3 + γ4) is known. 
Consequently,  λ  cannot  be  identified.    Bresnahan  showed  that  this  problem  can  be 
resolved by adding one more variable in the demand equation, namely PtZt.  Buschena 
and  Perloff  (1991)  and  Deodhar  and  Sheldon  (1997)  used  this  approach  to  estimate 
market  power  in  the  coconut  oil  exports  market  and  Soya  meal  export  market 
respectively.    This  study  is  a  special  case  of  Bresnahan  (1982)  approach  where 
identification problem does not arise in the first place. 
 
 




Table 1 describes the variables used in the estimation procedure.  It was observed that in 
the past retail price of instant coffee has been changed at most three times a year.  Hence 
we used triannual data points for our analysis.  Data on aggregate quantities of instant 
coffee  sold  in  India  (Qt)  was  collected  from  Euromonitor  (2006).    Due  to  the  high 
moisture-absorption property of instant coffee, consumers mostly buy the 50 gm packets.  
Prices of both brands are very close to each other.  In fact, currently (October, 2006) price 
of both the brands is Rs. 37 per 50 gm.    Hence, average retail price (Pt) of instant coffee 
was constructed by collecting price data on 50 gm packets of Bru and Sunrise brands 
from  the  authorized  dealers  of  Hindustan  Lever  and  Nestlé.    Some  data  were  also 
collected from CERC (1998).   For estimation purpose we converted all the data into 
tonnes-equivalent values.  Wholesale price data on Robusta green coffee were collected 
for the period 1996-2006 from the Coffee Board of India publication Indian Coffee.  Data 
on per capita income (Yt) were collected from the CMIE database.  Data on wholesale 
price index (WPI) and consumer price index (CPI) for industrial workers, used to express 
nominal variables in real terms, were also obtained from CMIE database.  1993-94 was 
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Table 1:  Description of Variables 
      Variables         Description                  
Pt   Real  retail  average  price  of  instant  coffee  in  Indian  market: 
Rs/tonne 
Qt    Volume of instant coffee sold in India: tonnes/4 months 
T             Trend variable: 1, 2…  
Yt     Real per-capita income of Indian population: Rs/4 months 





In order to evaluate the degree of market power we estimated equations (10) and (12) 
econometrically.  Based on R-square, t-statistics, and Durbin-Watson tests; double-log 
and  lin-log  forms  of  estimation  are  chosen  for  best  fit  of  the  regression  equations.  
Essentially, the equation (10) and (12) are estimated in the following form: 
 
(13)  t1 t 2 t 1 0 t ξ logY α ˆ logP α ˆ α ˆ logQ + + + =  
 
(14)  t2 t 3 2 t 1 t logQ γ ˆ logT γ ˆ logW γ ˆ P ξ + + + =  
 
 
Regression equation (13) is the demand function, and regression equation (14) is a supply 
relation in terms of first-order condition.  Hausman specification test showed the problem 
of  simultaneity  between  the  two  equations.    Hence,  OLS  estimators  would  not  be 
consistent and efficient.  Using rank and order conditions, it was also observed that both 
the equations in the model were over identified.  We used the method of 3SLS, which was 
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Table 2:  3SLS Estimation of the Model 
t t t logY   1.37 logP   1.67 16.9 logQ + − =  
                (1.2)
1  (-1.64)
2        (5.3)
3 
R-square between observed and predicted = 0.60 
DU =1.282 < DW =1.62 < (4-DU) = 2.72 at 1% significance 
             logT   20440 logW   19564 logQ   28257 P t t t − + =  
                    (2.13)
3              (2.56)
3                (-2.4)
3    
            Raw Moment R-square = 0.90  
           DU = 1.428 < DW = 1.62 < (4-DU) = 2.572 at 1% significance  
1 figures in parenthesis refer to t-ratios, 
2 significant at 5% one-tail test, 




The R-squares for both equations are satisfactory, and the Durbin-Watson ratios lie in the 
range,  DU  and  (4-DU),  where  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  autocorrelation,  positive  or 
negative cannot be rejected at 1% significance level.  In case of the demand equation, the 
R-square is 0.60.  We did  not have any consistent dataset on any competing product for 
instant coffee.  We did try using wholesale price series of tea.  However, equation results 
were not satisfactory.  In fact, results improved after removing the proxy price for the 
competing product.  Similarly, we assume that the supply relation passes through origin.  
I.e. price and marginal cost are zero when output, and input price are zero, and effects of 
other variables are captured by the trend variable




If the two equations were to be estimated in levels, then λ is calculated by finding out the 
product (-α1γ3) from equations (10) and (12).  However, for better econometric results, 
these  equations  were  estimated  in  double-log  form  and  lin-log  form  respectively.  
                                                 
‡  One  certainly  cannot  assume  away  intercept  term  for  a  demand  function.    Supply  relation  can  be 
considered passing through origin.  Theil (1978) points out that if there is an economic justification for 
removing  intercept  term,  the  slope  coefficient  may  be  estimated  with  greater  precision  than  with  the 
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Therefore,  the  coefficients  α ˆ 1  and  γ ˆ 3  from  equations  (13)  and  (14)  need  to  be 






P in    change   Relative




1 • = = , therefore 










Q in    change   Relative












3 = = =    
(19)  Market Power  8 0.12 (26.25) * 0.0049) ( γ α λ 3 1 = − − = − =  
 
The estimated value of market power parameter λ is 0.128.  This value is quite close to 
competitive solution (λ = 0) than to collusive solution (λ = 1).  It is also lower than the 
Cournot-Nash solution (λ = 0.5).  Given the value of λ and the price elasticity of market 
demand, the mark-up of price over marginal cost turns out to be 0.08 or 8 percent.  The 
market power parameter λ, however, is a multiplication of two coefficients from two 
different  regression  equations,  it  does  not  have  a  standard  error  of  its  own  to  test 
hypothesis of a perfectly competitive, Cournot-Nash or a collusive solution.  Therefore 
we bootstrap the equations to get a standard error for the market power parameter. 
 
Bootstrapping for λ 
 
We conduted the bootstrap procedure (Efron, 1979) in order to estimate an empirical 
standard error for the market power parameter.  This procedure enables us to generate a 
distribution for the market power parameter λ.  The procedure is a computer-intensive, 
non-parametric approach to statistical inference based on data resampling.  It involves 
saving  the  regression  errors  for  each  observation;  randomly  sampling  the  errors  with 
replacement; generating a new dependent variable by using the resampled errors, and 
finally, regressing the newly created dependent variable on explanatory variables. Judge 
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procedure was performed 1000 times on both the equations (13) and (14), and λ was 
calculated each time, giving a standard error of 0.5.  On the basis of this procedure, we 
could  reject  the  hypothesis  of  collusive  bahaviour  but  the  hypothesis  of  perfect 
competition and Cournot-Nash behaviour could not be rejected (Table 3).  Figure 1 gives 
the histogram of boostrap distribution of λ. 
 
Table 3:  Hypothesis Testing for Bootstrapped λ 
Hypothesis          Test Statistic                Remark 
H0: λ = 0, H1: λ > 0            0.25                       Cannot reject H0 at 
5% or 1% 
(Perfect Competition)               significance,  one-tail 
test. 
 
H0: λ = 1, H1: λ < 1        -1.74    Reject  H0  at  5%  and 
1% 
(Collusive behaviour)            significance,  one-tail 
test 
 
H0: λ = 0.5, H1: λ ≠ 0.5          -0.74    Cannot  reject  H0  at 
5% or 1% 
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5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The new competition policy of the Government of India that replaced MRTP, seeks to 
promote competition to protect consumer interests and increase market efficiency.  It 
becomes  imperative,  therefore,  that  one  knows  the  degree  of  competition  in  various 
domestic industries.  In fact, the degree of price transmission between farmers and final 
consumers also depends on the degree of competition in the processing sector.  Moreover, 
policy of trade liberalization too is expected to have impact on domestic markets.  The 
impact will be more pronounced if the existing domestic competition is characterized by 
collusive  behaviour.    Therefore,  one  would  like  to  know  the  existing  degree  of 
competition in the domestic markets.  In this context, we study India’s instant coffee 
market.  Circumstantial evidence regarding competition in the instant coffee market is 
rather mixed one.  The market is a virtual duopoly of Nestlé and Hindustan Lever for 
decades.  The companies have branded their products and product differentiation exits.  
At  the  same  time,  however,  Tata  Coffee  seems  to  offer  potential  competition  to  the 
incumbents.  In fact, instant coffee can be considered as a part of a larger beverage market 
with numerous competing products.  Moreover, since the year 2000, import quota has 
been removed and only a ‘moderate’ customs duty of 30 percent is charged on imports.  
Since then, imports have been growing although they are marginal at this time in absolute 
terms. 
 
The degree of competition in the instant coffee market was estimated by measuring the 
market power parameter econometrically.  The estimated value for λ (0.123) is much 
closer to 0 than to 1, indicating that the industry does not engage in collusive behaviour.  
Based on bootstrap procedure we cannot reject the null hypothesis of perfect competition 
or Cournot-Nash behaviour.  Thus, one can infer that degree of competition is somewhere 
between  perfectly  competitive  to  Cournot-Nash  behaviour.    Trade  liberalization  may 
contribute  to  competition  in  the  market,  however,  given  the  sufficient  degree  of 
competition  already  in  the  market,  the  impact  may  not  be  as  pronounced.    Having 
estimated  the  degree  of  competition,  one  may  focus  on  the  issue  of  degree  of  price 
transmission between farm-gate coffee prices to retail prices.  The current study could be 
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coffee by leading producers.  Econometric estimation of market power and in-depth case 
studies could also be done for other industries.  The current paper considers a static model  
to estimate degree of competition.  Given sufficient data, one should be able to consider 
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